Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Aldrich, Nelson, Weight, and Esplin v. Industrial
Commision of Utah, Department of Employment
Security : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Winston M. Faux; Utah Employment Security; Attorney for Respondent.
Jens P. Fugal; Gary H. Weight; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight, and Esplin; Attorneys Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Aldrich, Nelson, Weight, & Esplin v. Industrial Commision of Utah, No. 930645 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5569

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

K .- U
5J

^36^4^
JENS P. FUGAL (1135)
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Appellant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200

Telephone:

373-4912
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT,
& ESPLIN,
Case No. 930645-CA
Appellant,
vs.
Priority No. 7
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Department of Employment
Security,
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A DECISION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
ENTERED JUNE 2, 1992, BY THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE KENNETH A. MAJOR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
WINSTON M. FAUX
UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

JENS P. FUGAL (1135)
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
43 East 200 North

Attorney for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

P.O. BOX "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200

31994

JENS P. FUGAL (1135)
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Appellant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200
Telephone: 373-4912
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT,
& ESPLIN,
Case No. 930645-CA
Appellant,
vs.
Priority No. 7
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Department of Employment
Security,
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A DECISION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
ENTERED JUNE 2, 1992, BY THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE KENNETH A. MAJOR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
WINSTON M. FAUX
UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
140 East 300 South
P.O. BOX 11600
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

JENS P. FUGAL (1135)
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
43 East 200 North
P.O. BOX "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200

Attorney for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

JENS P. FUGAL (1135)
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Appellant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200
Telephone: 373-4912
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT,
& ESPLIN,
Case No. 930645-CA
Appellant,
vs.
Priority No. 7
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Department of Employment
Security,
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A DECISION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
ENTERED JUNE 2, 1992, BY THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE KENNETH A. MAJOR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
WINSTON M. FAUX
UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

JENS P. FUGAL (1135)
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
43 East 200 North
P.O. BOX "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200

Attorney for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION

1

STATE OF ISSUES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

5

ARGUMENTS

6

POINT I
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
MANNER IN DETERMINING THAT THE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD
SHOULD BE NO DIFFERENT THAN ITS EARLIER DECISION THAT THE
HEARINGS WERE ONLY FOUR (4) HOURS IN LENGTH
6
A.

IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FACTUAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
ITS DECISION, THE BOARD ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS MANNER
6

B.

APPELLANT'S POSITION OF BEING AWARDED REASONABLE
FEES IS SUPPORTED BY PRIOR CASE AUTHORITY IN THE
STATE OF UTAH
10

POINT II
THE CLAIMANT BELOW, ABRAHAM KARBAKHSH, WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS
WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 562-18B-3.5, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DUE PROCESS IN OTHER WAYS . . . . 12
POINT III
THE LIMITATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE IS
AN EFFECTIVE DENIAL OF A REMEDY BY DUE COURSE OF LAW, UNDER
SECTION 11 OF ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
18
POINT IV
A LIMITATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS, IN THIS INSTANCE,
EFFECTIVELY A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW PURSUANT TO SECTION
1 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
19

i

POINT V
APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OP LAW, PURSUANT TO SECTION
1 OP THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, WHERE THE BOARD CONSIDERED EVIDENCE AND
ARGUMENTS OUTSIDE THE RECORD, WITHOUT ALLOWING APPELLANT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OR
ARGUMENTS
20
CONCLUSION

25

ADDENDUM

27

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes

Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 1

2, 6, 19, 20

Constitution of Utah, Section 7 Article I

18

Constitution of Utah, Section 11 Article I
2, 5, 18
Utah Administrative Code, R562-18B-3.5
2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 22, 23, 24
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(1)

3

Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(2)

3

Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(d)

3

Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(g)

2

Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)

1

Cases
B.F. Goodrich Co, v. State Industrial Court,
429 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1967)

20

Johnson v. Dept. of Emp. Security, 782 P.2d 965
at 968 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989)

2

McCluskey v. Industrial Commission,
296 P.2d 443 (Ariz. 1956)

9

Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 50
817 P.2d 316 (Ut. 1991)

3

Robert G. Beloud. Inc. v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd.. 50
Cal. App. 3d 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)
9
Thatcher v. Industrial Commission. 207 P.2d 178
(Ut. 1949)
10, 11, 12, 23, 24

iii

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT,
& ESPLIN,
Case No. 930645-CA
Appellant,
vs.
Priority No. 7

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Department of Employment
Security,
Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to §78-2a-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a)

the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or
appeals from the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except
the
Public
Service
Commission,
State
Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;...
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The following issues are presented for review:
1. Did the Board of Review act in an arbitrary and capricious
manner in determining that the attorney's fees award should be no
different in light of the Appellate Court's view that the Board had
erred

earlier

in

finding

that

the

hearings

before

Administrative Law Judge were only four (4) hours in length?
1

the

2.

Was the claimant below, Abraham Karbakhsh, denied "due

process" within the meaning of R562-18B-3.5, which would preclude
in some other way an opportunity for due process?
3. Under Section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah,
is the limitation of attorney's fees as applied in this case an
effective denial of a remedy by due course of law?
4. Is the limitation of attorney's fees effectively a denial
of due process of law pursuant to Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution?
5.
Section

Was Appellant denied due process of law, pursuant to
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

constitution, after remand

States

from this Court, where the Board

considered evidence and arguments outside the record below without
allowing Appellant an opportunity to be heard to present additional
evidence or arguments?
The standard of review for each issue stated above is as
follows:
(A) For issue l above, in considering an appeal from a state
agency, the standard of review is that an appellate court may grant
relief if the agency action is based upon a determination of fact
made or implied by the agency that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court
(§63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code Annotated),

Substantial evidence is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.

Johnson v. Dept. of Emp.

Security, 782 P.2d 965 at 968 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989).
2

(B) For issues 2, 3, 4 and 5 above, constitutional questions
are characterized as questions of law, and under sub-section (4)(d)
of §63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated, agency determinations of law,
which

include

interpretations

of

the

state

and

federal

constitutions, and are to be reviewed under a correction of error
standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision.

Questar

Pipeline Co, v. Utah State Tax Commission, 817 P.2d 316 (Ut. 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant represented Abraham Karbakhsh in a hearing before
Kenneth A. Major, Administrative Law Judge, to determine Mr.
Karbakhsh's eligibility for unemployment benefits. Mr. Karbakhsh
had been charged with theft by deception as a basis to deny
benefits under §35-4-5(b)(2) of the Utah Code, However, since the
charges were dismissed at the preliminary hearing, the reasons for
denial of benefits were thereafter considered under §35-4-5(b)(1),
Utah Code Annotated.
Mr, Karbakhsh sought counsel to represent him in his claim for
unemployment benefits and originally retained counsel in the Salt
Lake City area. Said counsel progressed in the case to a point and
then Mr. Karbakhsh approached Appellant and indicated that his Salt
Lake counsel was too expensive and that he could not afford to go
forward with his claims against WordPerfect Corporation under the
arrangements he had with said counsel.
Mr. Karbakhsh solicited Appellant to represent him in three
related matters, 1) his claim for unemployment benefits, 2) an
unlawful discrimination claim pending before the Equal Employment
3

Opportunity Commission and 3) a wrongful termination claim against
WordPerfect Corporation,

Based on the complexity of his case, he

was advised that Appellant would provide two (2) attorneys, one (1)
of which had successfully represented him in the criminal charges
and that the total fee would be Four Thousand Three Hundred Dollars
($4,300.00) for the three matters.

Mr. Karbakhsh accepted the

employment agreement and paid Appellant Four Thousand Three Hundred
Dollars ($4,300.00).
In sharp contrast to the usual hearing which lasts from 45
minutes to one hour, this hearing was some 13 hours of hearing time
continued twice to hearing dates one week apart. Furthermore, the
transcripts generated during the hearings were many times more than
the usual volume in such proceedings.

The employer called seven

(7) of its paid employees as witnesses, and one (1) former employee
and a third-party witness, in presenting its case.

(R. at 6).

Following the hearing, Appellant submitted its claim for
attorney's fees in the amount of Four Thousand Three Hundred
Dollars ($4,300.00) which included the time of two (2) attorneys
for preparation for the case and attending over 13 hours of hearing
time.
to

One

(R. at 4,5).
Thousand

The Administrative Law Judge limited the fees
Four Hundred

Thirty-six

and

50/100

Dollars

($1,436.50), 25 percent (25%) of claimant's maximum unemployment
entitlement of Five Thousand

Seven Hundred

Forty-six Dollars

($5,74 6.00) pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R562-18b-3.5.
Appellant's challenge to the Commission's finding that the
hearings had lasted for only four (4) hours was upheld by this
4

Appellate Court, and it issued an Order of Remand, (R. at 38), to
that effect, ordering the Board of Review to reconsider the matter
in light of the Court1s finding of error.
The Board of Review affirmed the Administrative Law Judgefs
decision providing not even a bare minimum of its reasoning behind
its decision•

However, the Board of Review did rely on evidence

that was not part of the record, in affirming the Administrative
Law Judge's decision, without affording to the Appellant any means
of either refuting this external evidence, or any other means of
presenting its side of the case.
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS
The Board of review acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner in determining the attorney's fees.

The Board failed to

point out any factual evidence in the record to support its
decision.

Further, the reasoning

set out by the Board

in

justifying its decision is based on factual inaccuracies.
The claimant below, Abraham Karbakhsh, was denied due process
within the meaning of Rule 562-18B-3.5, which would preclude an
opportunity for due process in other ways. The Administrative Code
allows for a waiver of the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on allowable
attorney's fees.

Due process considerations require a waiver of

this ceiling in the present situation, and further require an award
of attorney's fees consistent with Appellant's claims.
The limitation of attorney's fees as applied in this case is
an effective denial of a remedy by due course of law under Section
11 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah, and effectively a
5

denial

of

due

process

of

law

pursuant

to

Section

1

of

the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The

Board

erred

in

its

provision of Rule 562-18B-3.5.

application

of

the

due

process

Further, in considering evidence

and arguments outside the record, and denying the Appellant an
opportunity

to

be

heard

to

present

additional

evidence

or

arguments, the Appellant was denied due process of law.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER IN
DETERMINING THAT THE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD SHOULD BE NO DIFFERENT
THAN ITS EARLIER DECISION WHICH WAS BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS FINDING
THAT THE HEARINGS WERE ONLY FOUR (4) HOURS IN LENGTH.
A.

IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FACTUAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS
DECISION, THE BOARD ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
MANNER IN TAKING ITS DECISION.

In its Decision dated July 27, 1992, the Board of Review
erroneously found that the hearing before the Administrative Law
Judge "lasted approximately four (4) hours and the attorneys had
several consultation sessions with the claimant."

Arguably, the

grant of a lower fee is consistent with the Board f s finding that
less time was

involved

than

actually was

involved.

subsequently, pursuant to an Order of Remand by the

However,
Appellate

Court, (R. at 38), the Board acknowledged its error and accepted
that the hearings had lasted approximately 13 hours.

Despite this

acknowledgement, the Board chose to affirm its earlier decision
without citing much insight regarding its choice.
The Board of Review f s decision, dated September 10, 1993, (R.
at 63), is replete with factual inaccuracies, which arguably form
6

the basis of its decision*

The assertion that throughout the

hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, the claimant Mr.
Karbakhsh " .... was represented by two attorneys from the law firm
and was billed accordingly.", (R. at 63) , does not find any support
from the record; and is in fact incorrect.

In actuality, because

of prior commitments, neither attorney could devote full time to
either preparation or attendance at the hearings.

(R. at 4,5).

The times when both attorneys were present was due to the demands
of the case and not merely an attempt to run up legal fees by the
Appellant. In any case, the Board's decision itself fails to shed
any light on how the alleged presence of both attorneys throughout
the hearings is relevant to the Board's decision. In the complete
absence of any such elucidation, Appellant is left to its own
devices to infer a conclusion from this assertion and its relation
to the Board's ultimate decision.

Arguably, if the Board was

trying to justify its decision for limiting the Appellant's fees by
showing that these fees were generated by time spent on the case
that was really not required to be spent, then obviously the Board
committed

an

error,

and

its

ultimate

finding

is

similarly

erroneous.
The

Board

also

chooses

to

characterize

the

underlying

proceeding of claimant Karbakhsh as a "....fairly straightforward
legal matter underlying this dispute (did the employer have just
cause for discharging the claimant) , it was unnecessary of the law
firm to represent the claimant with two attorneys and then charge
him for it."

(R. at 64).

Appellees of their own admissions have
7

stated in their earlier brief that the underlying proceeding
referred to, lasted over 13 times more than the length of the
average proceeding, and produced a record that was many times as
voluminous as the average. And yet, the Appellees are seeking to
escape the inexorable conclusion of their own admissions that this
was a considerably more complex and lengthy proceeding than the
average hearing, by

trying

to

characterize

it as

a

fairly

straightforward legal matter.
The Board of Review asserts that it was unnecessary for the
law firm to represent the claimant with two attorneys and charge
him for the fairly straightforward legal matter underlying this
dispute. (R. at 64) The parties obviously did not find the matter
as straightforward as the Board now claims.
view of the complexity

Consistent with its

of the case, WordPerfect

Corporation

employed the services of at least two attorneys at Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker, (R. at 6), in addition to two of their own full time inhouse counsel, and also introduced nine (9) witnesses, all of whom
had been well prepared to testify.

(R. at 6).

Therefore, the Board's decision seems to rest on factual
inaccuracies and mere bald assertions that are totally unsupported
by any evidence in the record, even though the Board does assert
that, "After careful consideration of the record in this matter,
the Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge to be a correct application of the provisions of the Utah
Employment Security Act, supported by competent evidence and,
therefore, affirms the decision."
8

(R. at 64).

Yet the Board's

enumeration of its decision is singularly lacking in any kind of
substantive evidence in the record, that would support such a
decision.

In Robert G. Beloud, Inc. v. Workers Compensation

Appeals Bd. , 50 Cal. App. 3d 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) , the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth District annulled the decision of the
Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, for failure to state evidence
relied upon and specify in detail the reasons for its decision.
The Court held that a recitation by the Board that the fee allowed
was reasonable in view of time, effort, and skill expended and
result achieved was not sufficient.
"Decisions

of

Worker's

The Court further said that,

Compensation

Appeals

Board

must

be

rationally related to factors germane to resolution of particular
problem and must be supported by substantial evidence in light of
whole record."

Id.

Considering the total lack of any supporting evidence to
justify its decision, and the lack of any cogent reasoning for the
same, the Board's decision can only be characterized as arbitrary
and capricious.

In McCluskey v. Industrial Commission. 296 P.2d

443 (Ariz. 1956), the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed an award of
the Industrial Commission fixing attorney's fees for an attorney of
a claimant in a workmen's compensation case, under the relevant
Arizona statute.

The Court held that the Commission could not be

arbitrary or unreasonable in the exercise of its discretion in
fixing attorney's fees.
The

Board

cites

Id.
Utah

Administrative

Code R562-18B-3.5,

Approval of Counsel Fees, as its justification for the limitation.
9

The cited section has been deemed to be an absolute mandate as
interpreted by the Board.
consideration
interpreted

that

the

Appellants submit for the Courtfs
cited

section

has

been

improperly

and applied by the Board under the present fact

situation, and will address this issue in a following section of
this brief.

B.

APPELLANT'S POSITION OF BEING AWARDED REASONABLE FEES IS
SUPPORTED BY PRIOR CASE AUTHORITY IN THE STATE OF UTAH

The Board also cites Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 207
P.2d

178

(Utah 1949),

(R. at 64), for the proposition that

attorney's fee recovery in worker's compensation cases is governed
by a blanket fee limitation rule, which admits no exceptions, and
which arguably allows for arbitrary and capricious decisions like
the one under review.

On the contrary, Thatcher is merely an

elaboration of the rule of reasonableness, seeking to balance the
best

interests

of

workmen's

compensation

attorneys who represent them.
compensation

claimants

and

the

In Thatcher, a widow claimed

for the death of her husband while employed by

another. She claimed that when he was injured, he was employed by
"Sholty." At issue was the question of whether or not the deceased
was employed by "Sholty" or "Seashore."

The Commission decided

that at the time of his injury, the deceased was employed by
"Seashore" and therefore not covered by workman's compensation.
Mrs. Rosenbaum then consulted with plaintiffs, Thatcher, who agreed
to take her case and seek a reversal of the Commission's order
10

denying the award.

The plaintiffs also agreed to accept a

reasonable fee to be determined if plaintiffs were successful.
Plaintiffs

eventually

were

successful

and

agreed

with Mrs.

Rosenbaum upon a fee of One Thousand Dollars ($1#000.00).

On

remittitur, the Commission vacated its previous order denying the
award and entered an order awarding to the dependents of the
decedent benefits in the sum of Seven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($7,250.00).

The commission also fixed the fee of the

plaintiffs for legal services at Three Hundred Seventy-five Dollars
($375.00).

Plaintiffs

thereupon

filed

with

the

Industrial

Commission their Application for Rehearing on the ground that the
sum of Three Hundred Seventy-five Dollars ($375.00) was inadequate
for

the

services

performed

and

that

One

Thousand

Dollars

($1,000.00) was a reasonable fee. The Petition for Rehearing was
denied by the Commission and the matter was appealed to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Commission and
remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
views expressed in the Opinion.
Among the views expressed by the Supreme Court regarding the
reasonableness of attorney's fees are the following:

"While attorneys may not hope to be compensated to the
full measure of their time and work, they must not be
limited to such niggardly fees that they cannot afford to
accept compensation cases. And particularly, where it
has become necessary to carry a compensation case to this
Court should the Commission be at least moderately
liberal in the allowance of attorneyfs fees...."

11

"It thus transpires that while the attorney and client
compensation cases may have freedom of contract to agree
on a fee for services performed by the attorney before
the Industrial Commission and before the Supreme Court,
such contract is not binding on the Commission and no
greater sum may be charged than that fixed by the
Industrial Commission, if the fee so fixed by it is
within the limits of reasonableness even though the
parties have agreed on a larger sum...."
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to
consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill
requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the
acceptance of employment in the particular case will
preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases
likely to arise out of the transaction and in which there
is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be
employed, or would involve the loss of other employment
while employed in the particular case or antagonisms with
other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar for
similar services; (4) the amount involved in the
controversy and for the benefits resulting to the client
from the services; (5) the contingency or certainty of
the compensation; and (6) the character of the
employment, whether casual or for an established and
constant client.
No one of these considerations in
itself is controlling.
The matter should be reversed and/or remanded with directions
to correct the findings consistent with the record in this
case." (Thatcher v. Industrial Commission. 207 P.2d 178, 182,
183, 184 (Utah 1949)
Therefore, Appellant's position is consonant with the dictates
of Thatcher that attorney's fees should bear a relationship with
the amount of effort put in, and subject to the due process
limitations of Rule R562-18B-3.
As such, the Board's decision is arbitrary and capricious, and
cannot stand in the face of its unreasonableness.

12

POINT II
THE CLAIMANT BELOW, ABRAHAM KARBAKHSH, WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS
WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 562-18B-3.5, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR DUE PROCESS IN OTHER WAYS
The claimant in the proceeding below was effectively denied
his rights to due process of law by the limitation on the
attorney's fees as interpreted or dictated by the Industrial
Commission of Utah. The Utah Administrative Code provides at-R56218B-3.5 as follows:
Fees will not be approved in excess of 25% of the
claimant's maximum unemployment benefit entitlement
unless such a limitation would preclude the claimant from
pursuing an appeal to the Supreme Court or would preclude
in some other way an opportunity for due process.
(Emphasis Added.)
According to the administrative code, if the 25 percent (25%)
limit would preclude an appeal or preclude in some other way an
opportunity for due process, the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on the
fees allowable to attorneys for the claimant may be avoided.

In

allowing for higher attorney's fees in the event an appeal was
taken, the drafters of this provision recognized that unusual
circumstance justified the setting aside of the limitation on fees.
Implicit in the notion of allowing higher fees in the appeal
is that the number of hours of attorney time involved would be far
more than in the usual case and that because of the extra time
commitment for attorneys in a case, there would be a substantial
dis-incentive to protect the rights of a claimant if there was no
adequate compensation for the additional time required to prosecute
the appeal.

Similarly in this case, the amount of attorney time

involved was far more than that involved in the usual case.
13

In

this case the hearing lasted at least 13 hours and was continued
over a period of two (2) weeks, which was considerably more than
the usual hearing contemplated by Rule 562-18B-3.5. As such, the
proceedings under issue are of the kind that could not have been
intended to be covered under a blanket application of the rule.
Further, the Administrative Code provides that due process of
law may justify avoidance of the limit. Under the Constitution of
the United States, the proceeding or hearing requisite to due
process must be appropriate, fair, adequate, and such as is
practicable and reasonable in the particular case.

It must be an

orderly proceeding, adapted to the nature of the case, in which the
person to be affected has an opportunity to defend, enforce, and
protect his rights. The fundamental requirement of due process is
the opportunity

to be heard at a meaningful time and

in a

meaningful manner. Since the essential reason for the due process
requirement of a hearing prior to deprivation of property is to
prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of property, such hearing
must provide a real test. (See 16A Am Jur 2d 841 and cases cited
thereunder.)

Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, there

is no provision allowing a hearing before the Administrative Law
Judge or the Board of Review regarding the issue of attorney's fees
charged to the claimant.
Unusual

circumstances

exist

in this

case which

justify

departure from the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on attorney's fees. In
this case, the claimant, Mr. Karbakhsh, was accused of taking a
large number of used and some new floppy disk drives suitable for
14

use in personal computers from his employer under circumstances
amounting to theft by deception or a fraudulent taking of property.
The hearing was much more like a criminal trial than like the usual
hearing for unemployment benefits.

The employerfs strategy as

evident by its presentation was intended as a pre-emptive strike
precluding the claimant's pursuit of a wrongful termination claim
and his pending unlawful discrimination claim before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.

The employer called nine (9)

witnesses to establish the alleged fraudulent statements made by
the

claimant

and

thereafter

introduced

documents

and

other

witnesses to establish the falsity of the statements to prove the
falsity of the statements made by Mr. Karbakhsh.

The employer's

case alone, from the recollection of counsel for the claimant,
involved eight (8) to nine (9) hours of hearing time before any
witnesses were called on behalf of the claimant.
At the hearings before the Administrative Law Judge, the
employer, WordPerfect Corporation, hired two

(2) attorneys to

represent its interests and made available seven (7) employees and
one (1) prior employee as witnesses in the case. Mr. Karbakhsh had
the right to have equal access to counsel of his choosing to fairly
and thoroughly represent his interests before the Administrative
Law Judge.

In this case, the proceeding was more

prosecutorial

proceeding

in

which

the

wealthy

like a

employer,

as

prosecutor, availed itself of many paid witnesses, and a staff of
attorneys to marshall the evidence, prepare witnesses, and present
a well prepared

case to the Administrative Law Judge.
15

Mr.

Karbakhsh, on the other hand, with his relatively meager funds,
attempted to defend his rights to unemployment compensation with
skilled counsel hampered, as is usually the case, by his inability
to interview witnesses then employed by WordPerfect Corporation,
who understandably enough were reluctant to testify against their
employer, as well as his lack of funds to be able to secure and
interview witnesses in his favor who had left WordPerfect and were
residing in other parts of the country.
Certainly this was not a fair hearing where so many exhibits
and witnesses were called and the hearing lasted so long that there
was no possible way for the counsel representing Mr. Karbakhsh to
provide adequate and responsive representation of his interests,
even for the modest fees requested, let alone the One Thousand Four
Hundred Thirty-six and 50/100 Dollars ($1,436.50) allowed by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Regarding the due process argument, the gist of the Appelleefs
claim is that, Mr. Karbakhsh was not denied due process because he
was fairly and adequately represented.

In the present situation,

what constitutes fair and adequate representation can only be
ascertained with reference to factual details of the actual
hearings.
The record establishes that the employer monopolized the
hearings and that the claimant's representation comprised only a
small fraction of the total proceedings.

The facts given above

disprove the Board's assertion that both parties were adequately
represented.

Unemployment compensation hearings are designed to
16

provide

a

simplified

and

less-expensive

forum

for

benefits

claimants, who might not otherwise have the financial capacity to
undertake legal proceedings against their employers.

As such,

these proceedings are provided to ensure the protection of the
claimant's rights. In the instant case, the wealthy employer chose
to perform what can only be characterized as a pre-emptive strike
against the claimant.

The mass of evidence presented was totally

out of character with the fundamental nature of such hearings,
clearly evidenced by the total time of the proceedings and the
employer's monopolization of the proceedings. As such, this alone
raises doubts about the due process validity of the instant
hearings.
Even so, once the Administrative Law Judge had deemed it
proper

to

allow

the

wealthy

employer

considerably

greater

representation than is normal in such hearings, then a similar
opportunity had to be accorded to the claimant not merely as a
matter of administrative discretion, but as a constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process.

Since the claimant's access to

competent legal representation and securing witnesses on his behalf
was severely hampered by his limited financial abilities, said
hearings failed to qualify as an adequate due process safeguard of
claimantfs property rights.
determination

of

Therefore, after having made the

allowing

the

employer

considerably

disproportionate representation, especially in this situation where
the employer was a wealthy corporation and expended many times the
expenses availed of by the claimant, it is a gross violation of the
17

concept of fair and equitable representation to allow the claimant
only 2 5 percent (25%) of his expected recovery, in legal fees.
The

claimant

was

therefore

denied

due

process

during

his

unemployment compensation benefits claims hearings.
POINT III
THE LIMITATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE IS AN
EFFECTIVE DENIAL OF A REMEDY BY DUE COURSE OF LAW, UNDER SECTION 11
OF ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
The right to advice and assistance of retained counsel in
civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process. In an
adversarial

system

indispensable

to

of justice, representation
effective

protection

of

by

counsel

individual

is

rights.

Pursuant to Section 7 of Article I of the constitution of the State
of Utah, In this case, the limitation upon the fees allowed by the
Administrative Law Judge effectively prohibited Mr. Karbakhsh from
obtaining

a

fair hearing.

Fair hearings

relatively level playing field.

imply

at

least a

In this case, the wealth of the

employer was displayed in the evidence adduced at the hearing.
There was no possible way for the claimant to compete.

After the

employer had presented its case in chief, practically all of the
resources of the claimant were exhausted and there was so little
left that there was no hope of obtaining assistance of counsel in
the prosecution
representation

of an appeal of the decision or

continuing

in the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission

action or the wrongful termination claim.
emptive

strike analogy

Referring to the pre-

again, the employer was allowed

such

considerable superiority of representation during the hearings,
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that the claimanl. did nnl have any real chance of effectively
preser.

i><* «nja i m;,! ^urh quantitatively insurmountable

evidence, given his modest financial means.
Fundamental
c^r^r&rone

adversarial system of justice is the

" cbamr

clients. If

:„;, . r- unlimited weapons while the other has
back/1

b

the

fairness

of

the

proceeding

must

be

questioned.
I
IOE.C

percei

llowing the employer *-° use a
waile limiting the claimant to fees
^^ maximum

'

claimant, while perhaps understandable
1

aimant

contracts, amounts
rigged so there

parental funct

-

.

25
the
f

n improvident

denial

ast is

effectively

:hance one ol

prevdiI„ UiCM

combatants can

i ui hearing within the concept

of cine process,
POINT IV
A LIMITATION OF ATTORNEYS FEES IS, IN THIS INSTANCE, EFFECTIVELY
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW PURSUANT TO SECTION I OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
e Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees
proceeding where their property interests are at stake,
m e representations
employe -

* the claimant and the

^ ^ hearings

also became fundamental-^ unfair
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yui
:laiman

, ou access *o

adequate legal representation is further being hampered by the
application of the fee limitation rule.
The right to advice and assistance of retained counsel which
is implicit in the concept of due process is eviscerated if there
is no provision for fair compensation in a hearing in which the
employer may dominate the hearing time through the calling of many
paid witnesses while the claimant is denied justice because his
meager resources essentially require that he find counsel willing
to represent him at far less than the usual rate of compensation,
let alone represent him
Administrative Law Judge.

on an appeal

from the ruling of the

As such, the Board f s decision violates

the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition of denying any citizen his
right to property without due process of law.
POINT V
APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW, PURSUANT TO SECTION 1 OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, WHERE
THE BOARD CONSIDERED EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS OUTSIDE THE RECORD,
WITHOUT ALLOWING APPELLANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD TO PRESENT
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENTS.
In B.F. Goodrich Co, v. State Industrial Court, 429 P.2d 787
(Okla. 1967), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that due process of
law inexorably requires that adversary parties before the State
Industrial Court be given proper notice and opportunity to be heard
before any of their substantial rights are altered or affected.

In

the instant case, the decision to limit the Appellant's fees was
taken

prior

to

any

intimation

to

the

Appellant

by

the

Administrative Law Judge that the same was about to happen, and
without any opportunity whatsoever to the Appellant to argue for an
20

except

percent (25%) rule.

Tne .
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rights
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' imitation,

Appeiian
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hearing
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and

bu^a action x^

inconsistent wi th due process where the Board states:
"The claimant chose to appeal the decision of the ALJ denying
benefits but the money provided to the law firm as a retainer
was exhausted.
The claimant, therefore, chose to be
represented at the Board of Review by his non-attorney wife,
who wrote a brief and provided excellent representation for
the claimant. The claimant chose not to appeal the Board of
Review's denial of benefits and has made no claim that his
failure to appeal the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals was
due to an inabil ity to obtain adequate representation." (R. at
63)
The record on the appea
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thereby
of

the

< • mil»i * «> < i s

case in chief comprised of evidence and testimony that indisputably
is excessive for the fee contemplated in this type of proceeding.
Therefore, it can be established that the Appellants claims are
justified by the rendition of services commensurate with the nature
and

complexity

of

the

proceedings

involved.

Despite

these

inferences, the Board claims that the Appellant cannot claim the
fees, unless it shows that the underlying claimants due process
rights will be violated if Appellant is denied these fees after
having provided the services. This is clearly a misapplication of
the relevant rule.
After establishing that the complexity of the proceedings and
the level of services rendered, which generated the fees, is
justified, it defies reason to argue that the Appellant has to
further prove a future violation of due process to be successful in
its claim.

Appellant

respectfully

submits

for the

Court's

consideration that such a grossly unreasonable application could
never have been intended by the drafter's of rule 562-18b-3.5.
Clearly, a determination of the reasonableness of legal services
required to satisfy due process requirements in an administrative
proceeding,

and

which

further

justify

a waiver

of

the

fee

limitation rule, cannot be conducted after such services have been
satisfactorily rendered. If indeed such services were necessary to
safeguard the due process rights of the underlying claimant, then
such rights of the underlying claimant can never be hurt by denying
the attorney's fees to the Appellant, as Appellant has arguably
already

protected

the

due

process
22

rights

of

the

underlying

claimant,
T
are at stake, and t h e Board w a s irrational in linking Appellant's
claim with a showinc

iolation of t h e underlying

h\\\n i M I H iiaii aiieddy iniiHlf\n;stl

future due process r
competent services commensurate
c

claimant.

critical

distinct : ™

claimant's

*nc\

protect t h e d u e process rights
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Board fail/
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>erceive this
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(

overturned.
1

sserts that the facts associated with
l e

^

the unemployment insurance case before the Administrative
had already been reviewed by the Appellants

connection w i t h its
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Appellants had already been paid.
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assertion untrue and fails to find any support from the record, the
Board comp] e I::e] y pr e c] i ided the Appe]

:i i ig the same

to show that Appellant w a s properly entitled t o t h e claimed amount
Q£

attorney's fees.
The pol icy

Code

Rule

e

562-18B-3.5

were

succinctl

nunciated. in Thatcher,

supra, that the attorney's fees limitation is designed t o provide
the claimanl

in unemployment compensation p r o c e e d i n g s #

t

possible benefit of any recovery, and to prevent such recovery from
bei i ig c s

i 1 •] ,

J lees.

Howevei

stated that any such

^ , ^n w a ? subject to

reasonableness, and ,

'_.__ nature
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hatcher

clearly

requiremem

f

tlle services provided w a s

germane to the determination of fees.

Further, Rule 562-18b-3.5

itself embodies an exception to the 25 percent (25%) limitation if
the claimant's due process rights are compromised.
It is indisputably established that the proceedings forming
the underlying basis of Appellant's claim were considerably more
lengthy

and

complex

than

the

average

hearings

involved

in

unemployment compensation claims. As such, Appellantfs claims for
a waiver of the fee limitation qualifies under the Thatcher
analysis:
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to
consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill
requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the
acceptance of employment in the particular case will
preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases
likely to arise out of the transaction and in which there
is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be
employed, or would involve the loss of other employment
while employed in the particular case or antagonisms with
other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar for
similar services; (4) the amount involved in the
controversy and for the benefits resulting to the client
from the services; (5) the contingency or certainty of
the compensation; and (6) the character of the
employment, whether casual or for an established and
constant client.
No one of these considerations in
itself is controlling. Id.
In this case, counsel spent a combined total time of 41.9
hours from the time they were retained by Mr. Karbakhsh to and
including the decision of the Department of Employment Security.
Appellant has spent considerable additional time in pursuing its
petition for approval of the fee and now in this appeal. Based on
the number

of hours spent by Appellant

in representing Mr.

Karbakhsh before the Department of Employment Security and based
upon an agreement reached between Mr. Karbakhsh and Appellant for
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compensation for legal

services. Appellant contends that
sand

Three Hundred Dollars ($4,300.00) , an amount consistent with hourly
rates charged by attorneys practicing

the Utah County area, and
-sei.

for Approval
hour

Appellant submittec

actual time

them were present.

spent

A

** 9

counsel was

dministrative

allowed One

Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-six and 50/100 Dollars ($1,436.50)

Dollar
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• , .,:r * * attorney time

the tir«~ expended * -•

* -' short

Jhe fees allowed for

modest amount requested

are to
the usual overhead requirements involved in running a law office.
, uneLe was no possible
way

.

larbakhsh o^ ^ n appeal ol the

repress

decisic ,- •: - ru Administrative Law Judge,

c]aim.

Howeve:

Appellant

Therefore, the due process rights granted

Appellant

under the United States Constitution were violated.
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request this C o m ' *

* i ;,i *: above,
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Appellants
*

"he Board of Review
HI mi

Hundred Dol.

respectfully

I I Kiu,..iiin I "

alternative to remand
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case to the Board of Review with instructions to amend the
attorneyfs fee award to be consistent with this Court's opinion.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 1994.

r
r ENS

P^. FUGAL^
Attorney f^jrAppellant

GARY |pT~w£lGHT
Attorney for Appellant
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copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Winston M. Faux,
Attorney for Appellee, at P.O. Box 11600, Salt Lake City, UT 84147
this 3rd day of January, 1994.
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ADDENDUM
Constitution of the U'niiAmendment, Sectior

States, Fourteenth

c
Constitution

Utah, Sect.

Utah Administrat /

* J<-, R562-18b— 5

L
Utah Code Annotatec

4-5(b)

Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4^
Utah

Codtj i I,Itj

Utah Code Annotatec

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
(Rights retained by people.)

majority, then irom tne two IMKU*^I ••«•»•»_.w „..
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President: a
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the
United States.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.

AMENDMENT XIII
Section

AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.!
The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT XI
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial
power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XII
[Election

of President

and

Vice-President]

The Electors shall meet in their respective states,
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of
the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and
if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three
on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the
votes shall be taken by states, the representation
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of
the death or other constitutional disability of the
President—The person having the greatest number
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a

1. [Slavery prohibited.!
2. I Power to enforce amendment.!
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.!
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. ( P o w e r to enforce a m e n d m e n t ]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.)
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.)
3. [Disqualification to hold office.)
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be
paid.)
5. [Power to enforce amendment.)
Section I. [Citizenship — Due process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
S e c . 2.

(Representatives — P o w e r to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
S e c 3. (Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President,

Section
24. (Uniform operation of laws.j
25. {Rights retained by people.)
26. (Provisions mandatory and pn
27. (Fundamental rights.]

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XL
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
XX.
XXL
XXII.
XXIII.
XXIV.

Declaration of Rights
State Boundaries
Ordinance
Elections and Right of Suffrage
Distribution of Powers
Legislative Department
Executive Department
Judicial Department
Congressional and Legislative Apporti
ment
Education
Counties, Cities and Towns
Corporations
Revenue and Taxation
Public Debt
Militia
Labor
Water Rights
Forestry
Public Buildings and State Institutions
Public Lands
Salaries
Miscellaneous
Amendment and Revision
Schedule

Section 1. (Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for t h e abuse of that
right
1896
Sec. 2. (All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all
free governments a r e founded on their a u t h o r i t y for
their equal protection and benefit, and they h a v e t h e
r i g h t to alter or reform their government a s t h e pub1 ic welfare m a y requi re
1896
S e c . 3 . (Utah inseparable from the Union.]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of t h e
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United
States is the supreme law of the land.
isse

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for la
abet ty, we,
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate
the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITt JTION.
1896
ARTICLE 1
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1. (Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. (All political power inherent in t h e people. 1
3. [Utah inseparable from t h e Union.]
4 I Religious liberty — No property qualification i to
vote or hold office.!
5. [Habeas corpus.I
6. I Right to bear arms.j
7. | D u e process of law.]
8. (Offenses bailable.!
9. (Excessive bail a n d fines — Cruel punishments. 1
10. (Trial by jury.l
11. (Courts open — Redress of injuries.!
12. (Rights of accused persons.!
13. |Prosecution by information or indictment
Grand jury.!
14. II In reasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.!
15. (Freedom of speech and of t h e press - Libel.)
16. (No imprisonment for debt — Exception. 1
17. (Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. (Attainder — Ex. post facto laws — Impaii n: ig
contracts.!
19. (Treason defined — Proof.)
20. JMilitary subordinate to the civil power I
21. (Slavery forbidden. I
22. (Private property for public use.I
23. iIrrevocable franchises forbidden I

Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed.
The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; no religious test shall be required a s a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote a t
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896

Sec. 5. (Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it.
1896
Sec, 6. [Right to beai arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear
arms for security and defense of self, family, others,
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use
of arms.
1984
Sec. 7. [ D u e p r o c e s s of law,"J
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law
1896
Sec 8. (Offenses bailable.!
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail
able except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge; or
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(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felony
charge; or
(c) persons charged with a n y other crime, designated by statute as one for which bail m a y be
denied, if there is substantial evidence to support
the charge and t h e court finds by clear and convincing evidence t h a t t h e person would constitute a substantial danger to a n y other person or
to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime a r e bailable pending appeal only a s prescribed by law.
1980
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.J
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 1896
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.
1896
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.)
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been com*
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
1896

S e c 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden —
Issuance of warrant.)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
1896
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press —
Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in
cases of absconding debtors.
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 1896
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896

Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to t h e civil
power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to t h e
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be
quartered in any house without the consent of t h e
owner; nor in time of war except in a m a n n e r to be
prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this
State.
1896
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.
1896
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any
franchise, privilege or immunity.
1896
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.
1896
Sec 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed
to impair or deny others retained by the people. 1896

biltties Including Interest and penalties which have not
been collected within eight years after the issuance of a
warrant will be written off, unless payments are being
received consistent with an installment agreement or
court order. All collection or offset action shall cease.
The debt will be forgiven snd forgotten as though no
such debt ever existed snd it will be removed from the
Department records. When an overpayment for fraud
established under Section 6(e) is removedfromDepartment records, the claimant may receive waiting week
credit and future benefits may be paid without reference to the prior Section 6(e) overpayment
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R562-18b. Approval of Counsel Fees*
R562-18b-l. General Definition.
R562-18b-2. Procedure,
R562-18b-3. Criteria for Evaluation of Fee Petition.
R562-18b-4. Appeal Rights.
R562-18b-l. General Definition.
The intent of Section 35-4-18(b) is to protect the intereats of the claimant who is dependent on his benefits as
a meana of livelihood during his period of unemployment. The Act does not address fees charged to employera by their representatives as employers are deemed to
be more knowledgeable in the marketplace and generally not in need of such safeguards,
R£62-18b-JL Procedure,
If a fee is to be charged a written petition for approval
of fee must be submitted by the claimant's representative to the Administrative Law Judge before whom the
representative appeared, or to the ChiefAdministrative
Law Judge if no hearing was scheduled. An approval
form can be obtained through the appeals office. The fee
may be approved as requested or a lesser amount may
be approved depending upon the appropriateness and
justification of the request
R562*18b*3. Criteria for E v a l u a t i o n of F e e
Petition.
Tho appropriateness of the fee will be determined
baaed on the following criteria:
1. Complexity of Issues Involved
A case Involving several complex Issues would obviously require greater preparation. However, services
performed which add nothing to the presentation of the
case are to be avoided. For example: A simple case having only one legal issue such as a voluntary quit would
not normally require more than two hours of preparation time. The same is true for most work search issues.
2. Time Actually Spent In:
a. preparation of the case
b. attending the hearing
c. preparation of a brief (if required)
A brief should be submitted only when requested or
approved by the Administrative Law Judge. If a brief is
submitted which is not requested or necessary, the
approved fee may be reduced by the charges for time
spent on the brief.

a. preparedness of the representative
b. organiration and presentation of the case
c. avoidance of undue delays
Documents and witnesses should be made available
at the time scheduled for the hearing and postponements should not be required except in unusual circumstances. Every effort should be made to go forward with
the hearing when it is originally scheduled especially in
benefit cases as claimants are frequently entirely without income during the course of the appeal processes if
benefits have been denied or if benefits have been
allowed, excessive overpayments may be created. In
recognition of the due process right for payment when
due, the Department of Labor has established a federal
standard requiring that 60% of all appeals decisions be
issued within 30 days of the date the appeal is filed.
Therefore, unnecessary delays justify a reduction in the
approved fee to the representative,
d. necessity of representation
If it is clearly demonstrated that the claimant was not
In need of representation because of the simplicity of
the case or the lack of preparation on the part of the
representative only a minimal fee may be approved.
4. Prevailing Fee
The prevailing fee is the rate charged by others for the
same type of service. In determining the prevailing fee
for the service rendered, credence will be given to information obtained from the Utah State Bar Association,
Lawyer's Referral Service, or other similar organizations as well as determinations previously rendered by
the Appeals Tribunal
6. Limitation on Amount of the Fee
Fees will not be approved in excess of 25% of the
claimant's maximum unemployment benefit entitlement unless such a limitation would preclude the
claimant from pursuing an appeal to the Supreme
Court or would preclude in some other way an opportunity for due process,
RG62-18b-4. Appeal Rights.
Should the representative disagree with the ruling of
the Administrative Law Judge, a written appeal may be
made to the Board of Review within ten days from the
date of issuance of the decision, l^ta appeal must set
forth the grounds upon which the complaint la made.
KET: Mittatptoym«at comjMtiMtloe, *oun»el«c*
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R662-19a. Prosecution.
R562-19a-L General Definition.
R562-19a-2. Guidelines for Referring Cases of Frsud to
the Courts.
R562-19a-L General Definition*
The intent of this section of the Act is to assess penal'
ties beyond those administered by the Department as
provided by Section 35-4-5<e). As it would be impractical and beyond the intent of the law to prosecute all
cases of fraud in the courts, it is left to the Department
to determine which cases will be presented to the courM
for addition*! civil pensltii*. A Prosecution BoaW
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(a) For the week in which the claimant left
work voluntarily without good cause, if so found
by the commission, and for each week thereafter
until the claimant has performed services in
bona fide, covered employment and earned wages
for those services equal to at least six times the
claimant's weekly benefit amount. A cfai'mant
shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the
claimant leaves work under circumstances of
such a nature that it would be contrary to equity
and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
The commission shall, in cooperation with the
employer, consider for the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence a
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity
and good conscience.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, a claimant who has left work voluntarily
to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse to
or in a new locality does so without good cause
for purposes of this subsection.
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant
was discharged for just cause or for an act or
omission in connection with employment,
not constituting a crime, which is deliberate,
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the
commission, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least
six times the claimants
weekly
benefit
amount in bona fide covered employment.
(2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty constituting a crime
or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection with his work as shown by the facts,
together with his admission, or as shown by
his conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction of that crime and for the 51 next following weeks and for each week thereafter
until the claimant has performed services in
bona fide covered employment and earned
wages for those services equal to at least six
times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.
If by reason of his alleged dishonesty or
crime in connection with his work, the individual is held in legal custody or is free on
bail, any determination of his eligibility
shall be held in abeyance pending his release
or conviction.
(c) If the commission finds that the claimant
has failed without good cause to properly apply
for available suitable work, to accept a referral to
suitable work offered by the employment office,
or to accept suitable work offered by an employer
or the employment office. The ineligibility continues until the claimant has performed services
in bona fide covered employment and earned
wages for the services in an amount equal to at
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit
amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits for failure to apply, accept referral, or accept available suitable work under circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a
disqualification.
The commission shall consider the purposes of
this chapter, the reasonableness of the claimant's
actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the

COMMISSION
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labor market in reaching a determination of
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience.
(1) In determining whether or not work is
suitable for an individual, the commission
shall consider the degree of risk involved to
his heafth, safety, and morals, his physical
fitness and prior training, his prior earnings
and experience, his length of unemployment
and prospects for securing local work in his
customary occupation, the wages for similar
work in the locality, and the distance of the
available work from his residence.
Prior earnings shall be considered on the
basis of all four quarters used in establishing
eligibility and not just the earnings from the
most recent employer. The commission shall
be more prone to find work as suitable the
longer the claimant has been unemployed
and the less likely the prospects are to secure
local work in his customary occupation.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this chapter, no work is suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter
to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the
following conditions:
(i) if the position offered is vacant due
directly to a strike, lockout, or other
labor dispute;
(ii) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual
than those prevailing for similar work
in the locality; or
(iii) if as a condition of being employed the individual would be required
to join a company union or to resign
from or refrain from joining any bona
fide labor organization,
(d) For any week in which the commission
finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage
of work which exists because of a strike involving
his grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment at which he is or was last
employed.
(1) If the commission finds that a strike
has been fomented by a worker of any employer, none of the workers of the grade,
class, or group of workers of the individual
who is found to be a party to the plan, or
agreement to foment a strike, shall be eligible for benefits. However, if the commission
finds that the strike is caused by the failure
or refusal of any employer to conform to the
provisions of any law of the state of Utah or
of the United States pertaining to hours,
wages, or other conditions of work, the strike
shall not render the workers ineligible for
benefits.
(2) If the commission finds that the employer, his agent or representative has conspired, planned, or agreed with any of his
workers, their agents or representatives to
foment a strike, that strike shall not render
the workers ineligible for benefits.
(3) A worker may receive benefits if, subsequent to his unemployment because of a
strike as defined in Subsection (d), he has
obtained employment and has been paid
wages of not less than the amount specified
in Subsection 35-4-3(d) and has worked as
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
statute governing the agency or, in the absence
of such a venue provision, in the county where
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal
place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the
party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the
respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency
action to be reviewed, together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of
the agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were
parties in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the
type and extent of relief requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief,
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine ail questions of fact and law and any
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section.
1990

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except t h a t
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:

6

(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule
which the agency action is based, is unconsti
tional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisc
tion conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issi
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pi
cedure or decision-making process, or has fail
to follow prescribed procedure;
(0 the persons taking the agency action we
illegally constituted as a decision-making bo<
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a detenu
nation of fact, made or implied by the agenc
that is not supported by substantial evident
when viewed in light of the whole record befor
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated t
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis
tency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious, uet
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or the re?
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-i
pellate court, the court may award damages or(
compensation only to the extent expressly auth*3
rized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by lawfj
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discr^
tion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;^
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date d
agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency foi
further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review ol
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute.
lttri
63~46b-l& Judicial review — Stay and othei
temporary remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it
finds that:

78-2-3

JUDICIAL CODE

(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
fa) capital felony convictions or an appeal of
an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and
(e) those matters described in Subsections
(3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3Kb).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1992
78-2-3.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-4.

Supreme Court — Rulemaking, j u d g e s
pro tempore, a n d practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for use in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, arid
admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
the practice of law.
i»86
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be established by the appellate court administrator, and
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court.
1986

78-2-7.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance
and services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986. 1988

C H A P T E R 2a
COURT OF A P P E A L S
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions
— Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.
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78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal.
1986
78-2a-2.

Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court??7
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
same as for the Supreme Court.
m*
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(21 The Court of Appeafe has appelate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of infor*
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex>,
cept the Public Service Commission, State .Tai^
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of.Oil*
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review ,
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies/pi
political subdivisions of the state or other to;
cal agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action undcS
Section 63-46a-12.1;

